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A 'VICTIMLESS' CRIME? HOW THE INTERPLAY
OF THE DEMAND REQUIREMENT AND THE
GOVERNMENT'S FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION
IS INJURING SHAREHOLDERS
PREFACE
The public and scholarly debate on corruption is largely focused on
the damage that is done to a local economy and the public trust in the jurisdiction where the bribe is made.1 This discourse has focused on the human
cost and the financial waste that result from corrupt payments to public
officials. 2 While this discussion is undoubtedly one worth having, one
constituency whose interests are also detrimentally affected by acts of international corruption is the shareholders of publicly held U.S. companies.'
When a corporate entity is investigated and punished, large financial penalties, a decline in stock value and the loss of goodwill are common consequences. 4 Shareholders' woes are compounded by the fact that bribery is
commonplace in many emerging markets, yet American businesses and individuals are forced to deal with an unprecedented wave of corruption enforcement activity.5 While public corporations are investigated and prose-

I

See e.g., Cyavash Nasir Ahmadi, Note, Regulating the Regulators: A Solution to Foreign

CorruptPracticesAct Woes, 11 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 351, 363- 67 (2012) (discussing "social, political and economic costs of corruption"); Moiz A. Shirazi, The Impact of Corruption on International Trade, 40 DENY. . INT'L L. & POL'Y 435, 435-46 (2012) (examining economic cost of corruption on emerging market economies); Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT'L
L. 861, 869 (2010) (noting that bribery causes the "public interest [to be] subordinated to private
individual gain"); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign CorruptPractices Act: Minefieldfor Directors, 6 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 145, 177 (2011) ("[R]unaway corruption
[in developing countries] undermines critical governing institutions, fuels public resentment, exacerbates socioeconomic inequality, [and] creates massive economic distortions ....
); see also
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, The Rationale for Fighting

Corruption, CLEANGOVBIZ, http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/49693613.pdf (last visited, March
6, 2014) (outlining economic costs of corruption).
2 See sources cited supra note 1.
3 See discussion infra Part III.B.
4 See U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, Restoring Balance Proposed Amend-

ments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 2-3 (October 2010) (addressing increased penalties
under Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); see also infra Part III.B (discussing cases alleging harm
done to corporation as a result of bribery investigation).
5 See RICHARD N. DEAN & PAUL B. STEPHAN, DOING BUSINESS IN EMERGING MARKETS: A

TRANSACTIONAL COURSE 11 (Robert E. Clark et al. eds., 2010) (discussing question of why corruption persists in many emerging economies). Dean and Stephan argue that endemic corruption
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cuted at home, their shareholders have been largely unsuccessful in their
attempts to hold corporate decision makers accountable for their involvement in international corruption schemes. 6
I.

INTRODUCTION

In today's international marketplace, deals are done across national
boundaries, oceans and cultural differences. U.S. companies are continuously seeking to expand their operations across the globe which inevitably
leads to a host of legal issues both at home and abroad. 8 Among the most
frequently encountered dilemmas is the widespread use of corrupt business
practices in international commercial transactions. 9

in transitioning and emerging economies is due to a lack of public and legal institutions capable
of dealing with the challenges of a market economy as well as undertrained and poorly compensated public servants. Id. Although many transitioning economies are seeking to liberalize, "the
public [in these countries has] come to expect public officials to be corrupt." Id. at 10. In the
context of a multinational enterprise (MNE) doing business in a developing country, an underpaid
local official may be in a position where he or she is deciding the fate of a multi-million dollar
investment. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 420 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010).
This leads to a dynamic in which the official is in a position to demand a payment of money or a
gift in return for a favorable exercise of discretion. Id. When a public official in a developing
country is vested with such significant power and is operating in an environment of little to no
oversight, coupled with a society that tolerates corrupt payoffs as a common occurrence in the
transaction of business, demands for payments, favors, or gifts become routine. ld. See also discussion infra Part II.B (noting enhanced regulatory and punitive crackdown on international bribery schemes).
6 See discussion infra Part III (overviewing pleading standards for derivative actions and noting effect on FCPA shareholder suits). A current example of these types of shareholder derivative actions is Cottrell v. Duke, 737 F.3d 1238 (8th Cir. 2013), in which dissatisfied shareholders
of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. are seeking financial redress for their directors' alleged misdeeds in relation to a widespread and sophisticated bribery scheme in Mexico. ld. The Eighth Circuit recently
vacated a stay that the District Court had put in place, thereby allowing the shareholders' suit to
proceed. Id. at 1249-50. Given the scrutiny that Wal-Mart has received for these alleged acts,
with extensive coverage in the New York Times, see Archive of Articles Regarding Wal-Mart,
Inc., NEW YORK TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companies/wal mart-stores inc/index.html
(last
visited Mar. 13, 2014). It will be interesting to see whether this case will fall in line with the pattern of unsuccessful shareholder actions that are the subject of this note, or provide the plaintiffs
with some form of relief.
7 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 5, at 10, 12 (discussing growth of cross-border
business transactions since World War II and accompanying cultural challenges).
8 See id. at 4 (noting transformation of legal profession as it pertains to counseling MNEs
doing business internationally).
9 See THE WORLD BANK, The Cost of Corruption, NEWS & BROADCAST, Apr. 8, 2004,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20190187-menuPK:34
457-pagePK:34370-piPK:34424-theSitePK:4607,00.html.
Total corrupt payments across the
globe amount to over $1 trillion each year according to the World Bank. ld. See also
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The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA" or "the Act") prohibits
American businesses from corruptly conducting their international dealings. 0 Since its inception in 1977, the FCPA has evolved to become a centerpiece of U.S. anti-bribery policy, as well as an important component of
the international fight against corruption. 1 This note analyzes the effect of
the Act's evolution on shareholder derivative actions which follow government investigations of publicly traded U.S. corporations. The analysis
attempts to point out that corporate entities and their respective shareholders are victimized by their decision makers' failure to adequately protect
the corporation in today's anti-corruption enforcement environment.
Part I of this article discusses the legislative history of the Act and
explains its substantive provisions. 12 Part II focuses on the recent history
of the FCPA and how the trajectory points to an increase in the quantity
and vigor of enforcement actions." Part III.A gives a brief overview of the
pleading requirements in a shareholder derivative action, which play a central role in determining whether the merits of an FCPA shareholder action
will ever see the light of day. 1 4 Part III.B then goes on to discuss the most
recent shareholder derivative actions which have sought to hold corporate
officers accountable for their failure to comply with the current FCPA
framework. 15 Part IV critiques the application of the Rule 23.1 pleading
standard in FCPA derivative actions, and argues that this procedural rule
goes beyond its intended utility by deciding the outcome of derivative actions which seek judicial recourse for directorial fiduciary violations. 16

MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY, DISTRIBUTION IN CHINA - LEGAL ISSUES 5 (2013) (noting wide-

spread corruption in China). For instance, "[i]n the health sector, bribery has become so common
that the Ministry of Health has issued draft guidelines that may require both patients and doctors
to sign a mutual non-bribery agreement before hospitalization." ld.; see also sources cited supra
note 5 (discussing environment in many developing countries, conducive to extensive use of corrupt business practices).
10 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(m)(b),(d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1, 78dd-2,
78dd-3, 78ff (2006).
11 See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (discussing increased focus on combating
international bribery as a matter of U.S. and international policy).
12 See infra Part I (noting political basis of the Act and substantive provisions intended to
achieve end result).
13 See infra Part II (discussing authorities' increased focus on FCPA enforcement and how
courts have interpreted Act broadly).
14 See infra Part III.A (explaining "demand" requirement in shareholder derivative litigation).
15 See infra Part III.B (summarizing most recent case law regarding shareholder derivative
actions following FCPA investigations).
16 See infra Part IV (analyzing patterns in unsuccessful shareholder derivative actions following FCPA violations).
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The Politics of the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was a legislative effort to combat international bribery by imposing a heightened ethical standard on
American companies and individuals doing business abroad.1 7 Triggering
passage of the Act was a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) report18 which exposed the rampant nature of international bribery at a time
when "Watergate" still weighed heavily on the American political consciousness. 1 9 The report exposed more than 400 businesses, including 117
Fortune 500 companies, who had admitted to making questionable payments totaling over $300 million.20
Congress was particularly concerned about the possible ripple effects of a culture of foreign bribery in which U.S. businesses were actively
engaged.21 Aside from being viewed as "counter to the moral expectations
and values of the American public," the practice of bribing foreign government officials negatively affected domestic business, because noncorrupt U.S. companies were excluded from commercial opportunities that
were given to others willing to bribe.22 Congressional denunciation further
argued that the practice of international bribery weakened "public confidence in the integrity of the free market system . . . . [while] shortcircuit[ing] the marketplace by directing business to those companies too
inefficient to compete in terms of price, quality or service, or too lazy to

17 See s. REP. NO. 95-114, at 4 (1977) ("A strong antibribery law is urgently needed to bring

these corrupt practices to a halt and to restore public confidence in the integrity of the American
business system."); see also Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 48 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 749, 750 (2011) (stating that FCPA sought to restore "public confidence" in American business dealings overseas); Ahmadi, supra note 1, at 351 (positing that FCPA was a political response to series of bribery scandals).
18 SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N., 94TH CONG.,
COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE

AND

REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS

AND

PRACTICES 1

(1976),
available at www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/sec-report-questionable-illegal-corporatepayments-practices- 1976.pdf.
19 See United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 834 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting legislative intent to
limit "negative domestic effects" after revelations of widespread foreign bribery); see also S.
REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977) ("The image of American democracy abroad has been tarnished.
Confidence in the financial integrity of our corporations has been impaired. The efficient functioning of our capital markets has been hampered.").
20 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977); see also Sam Singer, Comment, The Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct in the PrivateEquity Era: Extracting a Hidden Element, 23 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 273, 273-74 (2009) (discussing findings of report and its political implications).
21 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977) (discussing detrimental effects of corrupt payments on various sectors of the political economy).
22 See id. at 5 ("[I]n many cases the resulting adverse competitive affects [sic] are entirely
domestic .... [P]ayments have been made not to 'outcompete' foreign competitors, but rather to
gain an edge over other U.S. manufacturers").
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engage in honest salesmanship. 2 3 Finally, the prevalence of international
bribery by American companies had chilling ramifications on U.S. foreign
policy objectives because it allowed anti-American factions in the targetcountry to "drive a wedge" between their government's relations with the
United States. 24
B.

Structure and Purposeof the FCPA

The Act imposes both criminal and civil penalties on U.S. business
entities and individuals who bribe foreign government officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business. 25 The purpose of the FCPA was to
prohibit U.S. corporations from using the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce to corruptly pay off foreign government agents in their official
capacities. 26 The Act utilizes a two-pronged approach to combat foreign
bribery, by (a) implementing substantive anti-bribery provisions, and (b)
imposing accounting and bookkeeping rules on certain U.S. companies. 27
The SEC is responsible for all civil enforcement actions, whereas the Department of Justice (DOJ) handles investigations and prosecutions of al-

leged criminal violations of the Act.28
i) Anti-Bribery Provisions
The Act's anti-bribery provisions lay out the elementary framework of what constitutes an illegal payment to a foreign official.29 Unlike
the accounting provisions, which only apply to "issuers," the anti-bribery
23

Id.at 4.

24 See id. at 5 (discussing foreign policy problems created by culture of corporate bribery in

overseas business dealings).
25 See JEROLD A. FRIEDLAND, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 177 (3d. ed. 2010) (outlining purpose and history of the Act).
26 H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 5 (1977) (indicating purpose of FCPA).
27 See FRIEDLAND, supra note 25, at 178 (outlining Act's approach to combating corrupt foreign business practices).
28 See Sharifa G. Hunter, Note, A ComparativeAnalysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act and the U.K. Bribery Act, and the Practical Implications of Both on InternationalBusiness,
18 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89, 92-93 (2011) (describing division of enforcement responsibilities
under the Act). The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") generally investigates allegations of
bribery and passes its findings along to the Fraud Section of DOJ's Criminal Division. Robert W.
Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, A Proposalfor a United States Department of Justice Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 153, 160 (2010). The DOJ Criminal
Division in Washington, D.C. is required to give its express permission before any FCPA prosecution can take place. Id. Investigations of civil violations are conducted by the SEC's Division
of Enforcement. Id.
29 See McSorley, supra note 17, at 757-66 (explaining anti-bribery provisions).
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provisions cover a greater number of parties as they apply to "issuers," 30
"domestic concerns," 31 and individuals.3 2 A violation of the Act's antibribery provisions requires that a covered party 1) makes use of the means
of interstate commerce; 2) corruptly; 3) in furtherance of a payment or
promise to pay; 4) money or anything of value; 5) to any foreign official,
foreign political party, foreign political party official, foreign candidate for
office, or any person of whom one knows will pass on any portion of the
payment to one of the foregoing (intermediaries); 6) for the purpose of influencing an act of such person in his or her official capacity; 7) to obtain
or retain business.
ii) Accounting Controls
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch of the Federal Trade Commission
once stated: "If the anti-bribery provisions are the heart of the FCPA, then
the accounting provisions are its mind., 34 The accounting rules are intended to ensure honest and diligent bookkeeping for the purpose of providing
transactional transparency.35 The idea behind the imposition of an affirmative obligation to accurately and meticulously record transactional activity
was that it would make corrupt payments more difficult to conceal while at
the same time encouraging intra-corporate due diligence.36
Any publicly traded company that is required to comply with Sections 12 and 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act as an "issuer" of securities is subject to the Act's accounting rules.3 The statute specifically

30
31

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006) (prohibiting corrupt practices by issuers).
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006). A "domestic concern" is defined as "any individual who is a

citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and.., any corporation ... which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the
United States ....
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(1)(A)-(B) (2006).
32 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2006).
33 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (1998).
34 J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, U.S. Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977: Some Observations and Thoughts, Address before the Forum for EU-US LegalEconomic Affairs, 2012 WL 4328247, at *1 (Sep. 13, 2012).
35 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2012); see also FRIEDLAND, supra note 25, at 178 (describing
FCPA's accounting provisions); H.R. REP. NO. 94-831, at 10 (1977) ("the issuer's records should
reflect transactions in conformity with accepted methods of recording economic events and effectively prevent off-the-books slush funds and payments of bribes").
36 See Rosch, supra note 34, at *1 (explaining legislative intent behind FCPA accounting
provisions); WALLACE L. TIMENY & ROBERT B. VON MEHREN, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT THREE YEARS AFTER PASSAGE 32-35 (1981) (evaluating

arguments for and against implied materiality and scienter requirements in accounting provisions).
37 H.R. REP. NO. 94-831, at 10 (1977).
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provides that "[e]very issuer ... shall make and keep books, records, and
accounts, which in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer."" In addition, the accounting provisions specifically prohibit the knowing failure to implement
internal accounting controls as well as the knowing falsification of records.3 9

The record-keeping provisions apply to any U.S. issuer regardless
of its level of direct involvement in foreign business operations. 40 The Fifty Percent Plus One Rule states that even an issuer which does not engage
in any foreign business dealings of its own, may be liable for violating the
accounting rules if it owns a majority of a domestic or foreign subsidiary's
outstanding stock, and the subsidiary is found to be in violation of the pro41
visions.
II. THE MATURATION OF A 'PAPER TIGER' - THE ACT'S
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND TODAY'S ENFORCEMENT
ENVIRONMENT
A.

The 1988 and 1998 Amendments

The first amendment to the FCPA came in 1988 as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. 42 By 1988, the Act had been on the
books for over a decade, yet had only provided the basis for twenty-three
enforcement actions. 443 In an effort to transform the "paper tiger" into an
enforcement vehicle, capable of deterring corporate bribery, both criminal

3

15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (2006). The wording of this provision was part of a 1988 amendment to the Act, which has been criticized as weakening the record keeping provisions because it
requires proof of a scienter element ("knowingly") as a predicate for criminal liability. See Bruce
W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in InternationalBusiness Transactions, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 313 (2012) (discussing context and purpose of 1988 amendments).
40 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006).
41 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (2012) ("[W]here an issuer ... holds 50 per centum
or less of
the voting power with respect to a domestic or foreign firm, the provisions of paragraph (2) require only that the issuer proceed in good faith to use its influence, to the extent reasonable under
the issuer's circumstances, to cause such domestic or foreign firm to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls consistent with paragraph (2)"); see also Ahmadi, supra note
1, at 362 (discussing the Fifty Percent Plus One rule).
42 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1998)).
43 See Klaw, supra note 39, at 311 (citing small number of enforcement actions taken under
FCPA in first decade).
39
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and civil penalties under the Act were enhanced.4 4 Maximum criminal
fines for corporate entities were doubled, while the fine ceiling for individual persons was increased tenfold.45
The 1988 amendment however, also added two affirmative defenses and an exemption to the Act, which were intended to mitigate the harsh
effects of the criminalization of every questionable payment made to a foreign official.46 The affirmative defenses included (1) the local law defense,
which decriminalized the giving of a bribe, if the payment in question was
expressly authorized by the written laws of the host country; and (2) the
"reasonable ...bona fide expenditure" defense, which allowed reasonable
expenditures related to "the promotion ... of products ... or the execution
",47
... of a contract with a foreign government.
Finally, the routine governmental action exception - known as the "grease" payment exception for
its purpose of greasing the operational systems of public administrative institutions - provides that payments made for the purpose of "expedit[ing]
or secur[ing]" the performance of routine public functions are exempt from
the Act's anti-bribery provisions. 48 This exception however, was intended
to be narrowly construed to apply to payments which facilitate a foreign
official's non-discretionary, obligatory actions. 49 Any payment which acts

44 See H.R.REP.NO. 95-640, at 20 (1977) (describing the Act as potentially incapable of deterring acts of bribery); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(1)(A) (1998) (allowing for fines of up to
$2 million for violation of Act by "domestic concern").
45 See Klaw, supra note 39, at 311-12 (describing increase in maximum possible fines under
the Act).
46 See CRIMINAL Div. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT Div. U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, A Resource Guide To The U.S. Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 3 (Nov. 4, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf (addressing affirmative defenses as part of 1988 amendment). Passage of the affirmative defenses was motivated in part by
the fact that certain small payments or gifts were part of the legal and cultural norm in other parts
of the world. See Kyle P. Sheahen, I'm Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative Defenses
Under the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 28 WIs. INT'L L.J. 464, 469 (2010) (stating certain unlawful payments under Act were "customary and legal" elsewhere in world); see also Matt A.
Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 447 (2009) ("[G]iving expensive gifts for ... certain holidays, birthdays, and weddings, are an expected part of Japanese
business culture. Balancing these conflicting legal and cultural rules can be challenging, especially for companies doing business in several countries."); infra Part II.C.ii (evaluating narrow judicial interpretation of affirmative defenses).
41 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(c) (1998); see also infra Part II.C.ii (explaining affirmative defenses in
greater detail).
48 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(b) (1998).
49 See United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting legislative intent that
grease payment exception outlines "very limited categories of permissible payments"). Interestingly however, the addition of the grease payment exception in the context of the Act's historical
evolution has been interpreted as "strongly support[ing] the conclusion that the [government]
must bear the burden of negating the 'facilitating' payments exception." S.E.C. v. Jackson, 908
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to induce the official to take a discretionaryS action
in favor of the payor is
50
5
not covered by the grease payment exception.
The 1998 Amendment was borne out of congressional concern for
the disadvantage at which U.S. businesses were placed as a result of being
subject to the FCPA.51 Many international competitors were not required
to comply with anti-corruption laws in their home countries, which
prompted Congress to seek to even the playing field by enlisting the help of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD"). 52 Several years of negotiations resulted in the creation of the
OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions ("OECD Convention"), which was incorporated into U.S. law through the 1998 amendment.5 3
As he signed the 1998 amendment into law, President Clinton issued a signing statement in which he outlined his hopes for increased international cooperation in the fight against bribery:
The United States has led the effort to curb international
bribery .... Since the enactment[of the FCPA], U.S. businesses have faced criminal penalties if they engaged in
business-related bribery of foreign public officials. Foreign
competitors, however did not have similar restrictions and
could engage in this corrupt activity without fear of penalty ....
As a result, U.S. companies have had to compete
on an uneven playing field, resulting in losses of international contracts estimated at $30 billion per year. The
OECD Convention... is designed to change all that. Under the Convention, our major competitors will be obligated to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials in
international business transactions. 54

F. Supp. 2d 834, 857 (S.D. Tex. 2012). The Jackson court reasoned that the negation of the
grease payment exception by the plaintiff was a prerequisite to showing that the defendant acted
"corruptly," a required element of FCPA liability. Id.
50 See Jackson, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (analyzing legislative history of grease payment exception).
51 See CRIMINAL DiV. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT Div. U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, supra note 46, at 3 (noting Congress's "request" for negotiation of international agree-

ment criminalizing foreign bribery).
52 Id.
53 See Vega, supra note 46, at 437 (explaining 1998 Amendment).
54 President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition
Act
of
1998
(Nov.
10,
1998),
(transcript
available
at
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=55254).
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As of this writing, forty states, including several of the United
States' most vital trading partners in Europe and South America are party
to the OECD Convention.
The 1998 amendment gave the FCPA increased extra-territorial
reach, allowing U.S. authorities to scrutinize the conduct of non-U.S. citizens acting within the jurisdiction of the United States.56 Therefore the
amendment allowed DOJ and the SEC to investigate any party acting within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States regardless of the party's
nationality. 5
B.

The New-Found Vigor of FCPA Enforcement

Policy prioritization, collateral legislative developments, and increased international cooperation have resulted in expanded FCPA enforcement and the concomitant imposition of stiffer penalties. 58 Both DOJ
and the SEC have made enforcement of the Act a top investigative and
prosecutorial priority.59 As Attorney General, Eric Holder stated: "it is
55 See ORG. ECON.
IMPLEMENTATION
OF

COOPERATION
THE
OECD

& DEVELOPMENT, COUNTRY REPORTS ON THE
ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION,
available
at

http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/countryreportsontheimplementationofthe
oecdanti-briberyconvention.htm (last visited March 6, 2014) (listing OECD Convention's member states); see also U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FOREIGN TRADE, TOP

TEN COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE U.S. TRADES, available at http://www.census.gov/foreigntrade/top/dst/current/balance.html (listing top ten U.S. trading partners in 2012 as of November
2012) (last visited March 6, 2014). Seven of the United States' top ten trading partners are parties to the OECD Convention.
FOREIGN TRADE.

See supra U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,

56 See United States v. Jeong, 624 F.3d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming conviction of
South Korean national for bribing U.S. public officials). Interestingly, a South Korean court had
already convicted the defendant in Jeong for the same underlying offense. Id. at 708. In affirming
the conviction, the Jeong court ruled that the OECD Convention did not prohibit two signatories
from prosecuting the same offense. Id. at 711. See also Vega, supra note 46, at 437 (explaining
how 1998 Amendment allows authorities to investigate foreign individuals and business entities).
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (1998) (prohibiting "any person.., while in the territory of the
United States" from violating anti-bribery provisions); see also Vega, supra note 46, at 437 (explaining jurisdictional enhancement under FCPA' s 1998 amendment).
58 See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in
Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm;
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010) available at www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010March/10-crm209.html; see also Tarun & Tomczak, supra note 28, at 161 ("In 1994, the then largest DOJ corporate fine in an FCPA prosecution was . . . $24.8 million ....

In December 2008, the Fraud

Section, in conjunction with German authorities and the SEC, obtained record anti-corruption
penalties totaling approximately $1.6 billion from Siemens AG and three of its foreign subsidiaries.").
59 See Bethany Hengsbach, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance: Issues for Public
and Private Companies, Leasing Lawyers on Cooperatingwith Government Investigations, Navi-
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with purpose and urgency that we... chart a way forward that will make
our efforts to fight corruption more effective. 60 Since 2010, the SEC has
pursued fifty-one FCPA enforcement actions while DOJ has filed seventytwo such actions against businesses and individuals over the same time period. 61 The Obama Administration's aggressive anti-corruption policy has
led not only led to an increase in the quantity of investigations and prosecutions, but also to the employment of innovative investigative techniques. 62
The growing number of investigations backed by a tough enforcement policy has led some of the world's largest MNEs to diligently balance the risks
and rewards of entering into lucrative transactions and business relation63
ships.
Legislative developments have also greatly simplified the investigative process and added to the enforcement tools at the SEC and DUJ's
disposal. Chief among such developments is the "Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act" ("Dodd-Frank"), which implements
a whistleblower incentive scheme to encourage disclosure of federal securi-

gating Reporting Rules, and Implementing Compliance Programs,2011 WL 2117934, at 1 (May
2011) (discussing recent developments in FCPA enforcement); Roger Witten, Jennifer Morrissey
& Orlando Vidal, The FCPA: How Global Energy Companies Can Protect Themselves, 2011
Emerging Issues 5691 (2011) ("Under the Obama administration, federal investigators have
pledged increased vigor in FCPA enforcement efforts."); see also Ahmadi, supra note 1, at 362
(discussing "more aggressive stance" of federal investigators and prosecutors regarding foreign
bribery). In 2010, the SEC created a specialized FCPA unit, and the Department of Justice enlisted increased assistance from the FBI while adding staff to keep up with the volume of investigations and prosecutions it was pursuing. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited March 7,
2014) (announcing establishment of specialized FCPA unit); Witten, Morrissey & Vidal, supra
(describing recent enforcement trends).
60 See Attorney General Eric Holder, Address at the Opening Plenary of the VI Ministerial
Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity (Nov. 7, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-091107.html).
61 See U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FCPA Actions Brought By The SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-enf-acts-chart.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2013); U.S. DEP'T
OF
JUSTICE,
FCPA
and
Related Enforcement
Actions:
Alphabetical List,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/a.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (listing DOJ
enforcement actions taken under the Act).
62 See Witten, Morrissey & Vidal, supra note 59 (discussing changed nature of FCPA enforcement).
63 See Philip Urofsky & Danforth Newcomb, FCPA DIGEST, Recent Trends and Patterns in
the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, at 1 (Mar. 2009) ("More important than
the size of the penalty are the multi-year trends of increasing numbers of enforcement investigations and enforcement actions against both corporations and individuals, which have been accompanied by expansive assertions of jurisdiction by the U.S. enforcement authorities .... The increased risk of investigation . . . has resulted in increased sensitivity to FCPA concerns ... ."),
available
at
http://www.sheanman.com/-media/Files/Old- SiteFiles/LT030509FCPADigestRecentTrendsandPatternsinFCPAEnforcement.pdf.
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ties law violations including the FCPA. 64 Under Dodd-Frank, whistleblowers may be entitled to financial compensation for "successful enforcement" based on "original information. 65 Conversely, whistleblower
incentives under Dodd-Frank have been criticized as ineffective because
the most valuable whistleblowers in an international corruption case will
likely be foreign nationals, who are not protected against retaliation in their
home countries.66 One federal court has explicitly rejected an extraterritorial application of Dodd-Frank's whistleblower protection scheme,
thereby leaving many valuable informants without an incentive to come
forward. 6
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX") has also done its part to
expand potential liability under the FCPA. 616 SOX requires issuers to evaluate and report on the "effectiveness" of their internal controls, which by
nature implicates compliance with the FCPA's bookkeeping provisions. 69
For instance, an issuer's CEO, or similarly situated officer is required to
certify that she carries the responsibility "for establishing and maintaining
internal controls" and "evaluat[ing] the effectiveness" thereof.70 Moreover,
64 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-6, 78u-7 (2010) (defining concepts of "whistleblower" and potential
"awards"); see also Justin Blount & Spencer Markel, The End of the Internal Compliance World
as We Know It, Or an Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement? Bounty
Hunting under the Dodd-FrankAct's Whistleblower Provisions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
1023, 1039 (2012) (observing Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions may result in "race" to disclose securities violations to authorities). Particularly with respect to FCPA violations, the race
between the company and the whistleblower "may alter the dynamics of determining when and if
a company should self-disclose" because self-reporting may be a mitigating factor in a potential
enforcement action. Id.
65 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2010).
66 See Patrick Collins, Lee Stein & Caryn Trombino, THE THIRD ANNUAL NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, Consider the Source: How Weak Whis-

tleblower Protection Outside the United States Threatens to Reduce the Impact of the DoddFrank Reward Among
Foreign Nationals, at
1, 5
(2010),
available at
http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/10 25Article.pdf (discussing issues presented by foreign nationals who act as whistleblowers in FCPA cases).
67 See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, No. 4:12-345, 2012 WL 2522599, at *5 (S.D. Tex.
June 28, 2012) (disallowing whistleblower protection where "majority of events giving rise to...
suit occurred in... foreign country.").
68 See Klaw, supra note 39, at 316-17 (describing Sarbanes Oxley Act's effects on potential
liability under FCPA). For instance, SOX increases potential penalties for certain violations of
the Securities and Exchange Act (including FCPA bookkeeping controls) from ten to twenty
years in prison. Id.at 316.
69 See 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4)(C)-(D) (2002); see also ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M.
BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 236 (3d ed. 2009) ("The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the wake of corporate scandals has tried to enhance monitoring by
directors and a firm's internal controls to avoid illegal activities.").
70 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241(a)(4)(A) & (C) (2002); ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL GENERAL
COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL PRACTITIONERS

72 (2d
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"signing officers" are required to report to their audit committees, "any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the issuer's internal controls.",71 Accordingly, Dodd-Frank and SOX have contributed to an environment in which
multinational corporations must be vigilant about every detail of their overseas operations. 72
Finally, anti-corruption enforcement is on the rise abroad, as many
countries have enacted legislation, imposed regulations and advanced novel
policies to combat foreign bribery.
In 2011, twenty states, including the
governments of Russia, China and the United Kingdom, took action to
combat domestic and international bribery.
Russia, a country whose
businesses were found to be among the most likely to bribe, joined the
OECD Convention after criminalizing foreign bribery at the domestic level. 5
While the OECD Convention laid the groundwork for national legislative reforms, the UN also took an active role by adopting the United
Nations Convention against Corruption ("UNCAC"). 6 With UNCAC, the
UN sought to create an instrument that focused on bribery prevention and
criminalization, as well as the coordination of efforts to enforce anticorruption measures at an international level . The UN Convention is intended as "a binding instrument of international law for the global combatting of corruption." , ' As of December 24, 2012, one hundred sixty five
states are party to the UN Convention.
ed. 2012) ("Foreign Corrupt Practices Act investigations frequently trigger reporting or disclosure
responsibilities and certification issues for publicly held companies and their CEOs and CFOs.").
71 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(5) (2002).
72 See TARUN, supra note 70, at 73 (discussing reasons for intra-corporate due diligence).
73 See Leslie A. Benton, Melissa T. Bruijneel, Mikhail Reider-Gordon & Anne Takher, AntiCorruption, 46 INT'L LAW 353, 363-73 (2012) (summarizing anti-corruption actions taken by
foreign governments and international organizations in 2011).
74 See id. at 366-70 (summarizing domestic anti-bribery legislation around the world).
75 Id. at 371, 73; See also THE ECONOMIST, Grease My Palm: Bribery and CorruptionHave
Become
Endemic,
ECONOMIST
(Nov.
27,
2008),
available
at
http://www.economist.com/node/12628030 ("The size of the corruption market [in Russia] is estimated to be close to $300 billion, equivalent to 20% of Russia's GDP.").
76 See UN OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, United Nations Convention against Corruption
(2013), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ (describing UN Convention's
background and adoption process).
77 See JOHANNA BEATE WYSLUCH, THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
AND
DEVELOPMENT

COOPERATION

-

CORRUPTION

PREVENTION

BY

MORE

EFFICIENT

LAW

ENFORCEMENT?, at 5 (2007), available at http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib/07-0876.pdf (ex-

amining UNCAC objectives).
78 Id. at 6.
79 See UN OFFICE ON DRUGS

AND CRIME, UNCAC Signature and Ratification Status as of
27 September 2013 (2013), available at http://www.unodc.org/images/treaties/UNCAC/Status-
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Extensive Scope of Liability under the FCPA

Since its inception, courts have interpreted the Act broadly to create a broad scope of liability, capable of punishing even miniscule misconduct and individuals unrelated to the underlying bribe.80 In particular, the
flexible definition of a "foreign official," the imposition of a system of vicarious liability, and the practical unavailability of the Act's affirmative defenses make it difficult to avoid liability once investigated.81
i) The Broad Definition of a "Foreign Official" and the allEncompassing "Instrumentality"
Unlike the UK Bribery Act, which criminalizes corrupt payments
to governmental and non-governmental officials alike, the FCPA only co82
vers bribes that are made to "foreign officials" in their "official capacity."
A "foreign official" is defined as:
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person acting in an
official capacity for or on behalf of any such government
or department, agency or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international organization.83
Prosecutors have successfully given the phrase a broad meaning to
include employees of state-owned enterprises, due to their functional capacity within an "instrumentality" of the foreign government. 14 This construction has been criticized by commentators and hotly contested in the
courts, as defendants have argued that employees of state-owned businessMap/UNCAC Status Map Current Large.jpg (noting status of worldwide signatories).
so See Singer, supra note 20, at 281-82 (examining vicarious liability under FCPA); Sheahen,
supra note 46, at 464 (explaining how mere acts of "civility" may expose individual to liability
under FCPA).
81 See discussion infra Part II.C.i-iii; see also United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 446 (5th
Cir. 2007) (dismissing vagueness challenge to FCPA's prohibition of bribing to obtain or retain
business). The court rejected the defendant's argument that the payments were made for the purpose of securing lower tax obligations, and therefore were not made for the purpose of "obtaining
or retaining" business. Id.at 441-43.
82 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1)(A)(i) (1998); see also Hunter, supra note 28, at 96-98 (comparing FCPA and UK Bribery Act).
83 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(1)(A) (1998).
84 See Joel M. Cohen, Michael P. Holland & Adam P. Wolf, Under the FCPA, Who is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1250 (2008) (analyzing DOJ and SEC's "broad" definition of a "foreign official").
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es engage in strictly
commercial conduct and therefore do not qualify as
8 5
officials.
public
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") likewise uses the
phrase "agencies or instrumentalities" of a government for the purpose of
defining a "foreign state."816 In Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,1 the Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether an indirect subsidiary of the Israeli government could be considered an instrumentality of the state. The Court
held that the subsidiary was not an instrumentality of the government because the state only held an "indirect" ownership stake in the company."
Thus, to qualify as an instrumentality of a foreign government under the
FSIA, the sovereign must directly own a majority share of the entity in
question, without any intervening corporate layers.8 9 Analyzing the corporate structure of a state-owned business entity prior to making blanket assertions concerning its connection to a foreign government is in accord
with the act of state doctrine and traditional notions of judicial restraint in
the foreign policy arena. 90

85 See cases cited infra note 90 (taking up issue of state-owned enterprises as "instrumentalities" of foreign governments); see also Stephen Hagenbuch, Comment, Taming "Instrumentality": The FCPA's Legislative History Requires Proofof Government Control, 2012 u. CHI. LEGAL
F. 351, 352 (2012) (arguing interpretation of "instrumentality" which includes employees of companies is "problematic"); see also Cohen, Holland & Wolf, supra note 83, at 1250 (noting lack of

guidance from DOJ and SEC regarding term "instrumentalities"). The American Law Institute
("ALI") has also taken up the issue of defining the extent of what may be considered within the
realm of a state's official functions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 66 (1965) ("The immunity of a foreign state ... extends to ...a corporation created under [the
foreign state's] laws and exercising functions comparable to those of an agency of the state.").
Thus, according to the ALI, an employee of a business entity may be covered by sovereign immunity, provided the company exhibits some characteristics comparable to those of a governmental institution. Id. The ALI's definition appears to be in line with the legislative intent of the Act
because it only regulates corrupt payments made to individuals operating in at least a quasi-public
capacity. See supra text accompanying note 81 (distinguishing FCPA from UK Bribery Act in
that former only covers official action).
86 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2006).
"' 538 U.S. 468, 474 (2003).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (noting centrality of President's role in conducting foreign relations as inherent principle of constitutional law).
In Curtiss-Wright,the Supreme Court made a clear statement in support of a certain level of exclusivity of executive prerogatives on matters relating to foreign relations, describing the President as the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations." Id. at
320. In its emphatic statement of presidential power over the nation's international relations, the
Court limited Congress's oversight role, and implicitly noted its own resistance to interfere with
the executive as it conducts the external relations of the country. Id.at 321-22; see also Ronald
D. Lee, Note, Jurisdictionover Foreign States for Acts of their Instrumentalities:A Model for
Attributing Liability, 94 YALE L.J. 394, 403-04 (1984) (noting potential negative foreign policy
implications of expansive assertions of jurisdiction over foreign government instrumentalities).
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Although it is unclear whether a state-owned business entity's corporate structure has any effect on the company's status as an FCPA instrumentality, courts have been receptive to an all-encompassing view of the
concept of a "foreign official."9 1 Despite more restrained constructions of
an "instrumentality" under the FSIA, courts continue to rely on the flexible
nature of the phrase to impose liability under the FCPA. In United States v.
Aguilar, 92 the court rejected the defendant's contention that Congress refused to include payments to employees of state-owned businesses under
the FCPA. The Aguilar court based its holding on the absence of an express legislative exclusion of employees of state-owned businesses, while
admitting that the legislative history on this point was "inconclusive." 93
Aguilar indicates a sense of judicial accommodation to increasingly aggressive enforcement of94 the FCPA, even in cases where the status of the law is
ambiguous at best.

ii) Illusive Affirmative Defenses
The FCPA contains two affirmative defenses: (1) the local law defense, and (2) the promotional expenses defense. 95 Although intended to
rectify some of the disadvantages faced by American companies in their
international ventures, the affirmative defenses have been criticized as
woefully ineffective in achieving their stated objectives. 96 The local law

Lee argues that in the context of a sovereign immunities analysis, courts should exercise an appropriate level of judicial restraint in "piercing a veil created by a foreign sovereign" due to an
ambiguous state of the law and the potential for political repercussions. Id.at 403-04.
91 See United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding employees of state-owned electric utility company were foreign officials under FCPA); United
States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011)
(holding state-owned companies may be considered "instrumentalities" under FCPA). Aguilar
and Carson appear to be in line with the FSIA definition of "instrumentalities" in terms of their
focus on ownership as opposed to control of the entity.

See GARY B. BORN & PETER B.

RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 268 (Vicki Been et al.

eds., 5th ed. 2011) (noting FSIA's requirement of ownership of the entity as opposed to control).
The importance of state-ownership distinguishes the FSIA and the FCPA from antitrust, securities
regulation, and environmental regimes that "focus on control in corporate contexts." Id.; see also
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244, 265 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013) (holding defendant need not be aware of official's identity). The Straub court justifiably reasoned that, in
light of the Act's prohibition of corrupt payments by "any person", including an independent
agent or intermediary, it was not necessary for the defendant to have direct awareness of the final
recipient's identity. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d. at 15.
92 783 F. Supp. 2dat 1119.
93 Id.
94 Id.

9' 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c), 78dd-2(c), 78dd-3(c) (1998).
96 See Irina Sivachenko, Note, Corporate Victims of "Victimless Crime": How the FCPA's
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defense provides that a defendant is protected from FCPA liability if the
"written laws ... of the foreign official's... country" expressly permit the
scrutinized payment or transaction. 97 The absence of a written law prohibiting a payment is insufficient to insulate a party from liability under the
local law defense. 9 Because virtually every country has enacted legislation or taken a policy position denouncing official bribery, successful invocation of the local law defense is difficult. 99
Second, the promotional expense defense shields a defendant from
FCPA liability if the "payment... was a reasonable and bona fide expenditure ... and was directly related to the promotion ... of products or services; or the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government." 00 In theory, this defense removes the payment of costs pertaining
to the legitimate promotion of products from the scope of actionable conduct. 01 However, one commentator has labeled this defense a "riddle" because it only permits "reasonable
bona fide expenditure [s]" which are non102
corrupt to begin with.
iii) Vicarious Liability
The FCPA imposes a system of vicarious liability, which seeks to
punish a principal for the wrongful acts of its agent. 0 3 One scholar identi-

Statutory Ambiguity, Coupled with Strict Liability, Hurts Businesses and Discourages Compliance, 54 B.C. L. REv. 393, 409 (2013) (criticizing affirmative defenses as "impos[ing] few restrictions on the FCPA's expansive reach"). Sivachenko suggests the addition of a corporate
compliance defense as a means of incentivizing compliance with the Act. Id. at 410; see also
Sheahen, supra note 46, at 489 (arguing affirmative defenses "have provided little meaningful
protection" to defendants).
97 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(1) (1998). The local law defense is an affirmative defense that
places the burden of proof of its applicability on the defendant. See Sheahen, supra note 46, at
468.
98 H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 922 (1988).
99 See Benton, Bruijneel, Reider-Gordon & Takher supra note 72 and accompanying text
(discussing international trend of accession to OECD Convention).
100 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(2)(A)-(B) (1998).
101 See Sheahen, supra note 46, at 478 (explaining purpose of promotional expense defense).
102 See id. (citing Professor Richard Cassin's characterization of bona fide expenditure defense).
103

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3), 78dd-3(a)(3) (1998); see also H.R. REP.

NO. 95-640, at 12 (1977) (noting omission of vicarious liability regime would result in "massive
loophole."); see also STURAT H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 59 (2d ed. 2010) ("The most overlooked of all the compliance considerations relative to the FCPA ... is the conduct of third parties acting on behalf of an individual or
entity."); Singer, supra note 20, at 281 (mentioning congressional intent to install vicarious liability regime into FCPA); David Isaak, FCPA Compliance - Navigating the Minefield of Intermediaries, 17 WTR CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 22, 22-23 (2008) (noting international business deal-
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fied three distinct contextual theories under which FCPA liability may attach vicariously. 1 04 First, liability may be triggered when a person makes a
payment to a third party with the knowledge or awareness that the third
party will corruptly pass it on to a foreign official.10 5 Second, an entity
may be liable when it authorizes a third party to make a corrupt payment to
a foreign official on its behalf. 106 Third, a principal may be0 exposed for the
acts of its alter-egos under a corporate veil piercing theory. 1 7
In addition, a fourth form of vicarious liability may occur in merger and acquisition transactions.10 8 If an acquiring company fails to conduct a diligent pre or post-closing investigation it may become the subject
of an FCPA investigation for the corrupt acts of a target entity.10 9 There
are three possible scenarios in which a merger transaction can result in an
FCPA violation: 1) the transaction itself may trigger the Act, for example
by way of a corrupt payment to obtain the necessary approval; 2) the successor may be exposed for the target's prior practices; and 3) the target's
continued use of bribes may implicate the successor.110
Concerns about the liberal use of vicarious liability theories in
M&A transactions are only exacerbated by the fact that businesses appear
to be regenerating their appetites for corporate mergers after the global
economic crisis of 2008.111 The broad application of vicarious liability
theories, capable of covering virtually every corner of the international

ings often include intermediaries which may trigger liability for U.S. principals).
104 See Singer, supra note 20, at 281 (describing vicarious liability theories under FCPA).
105 ld.; see also Isaak, supra note 102, at 22 (stating that most high profile FCPA actions involve wrongful acts of intermediaries).
106 See Singer, supra note 20, at 282 (explaining vicarious liability under FCPA as a result of
third party actions).
107 See id. (addressing intra-corporate relations as grounds for liability under veil-piercing
theory).
108 See infra notes 109111 and accompanying text (discussing FCPA liability resulting from
merger and acquisition transactions).
109 See Lucinda A. Low & Thomas R. Best, Addressing FCPA Risk in Mergers and Acquisitions: At What Price Safety?, 1737 PLI/Corp 1023, 1025 (2009) (identifying mergers and acquisitions as area in receipt of significant attention).
110 See Low & Best, supra note 109, at 1028; see also Wesley C. Fredericks Jr., International
M&A Deals: Awareness of Differences as the Key to Success, 2012 WL 1199545, at *1 (2012)
("[T]he FCPA will generally apply to actions by the overseas target company prior to its acquisition, such that actions undertaken by the overseas entity prior to the closing of a transaction could
very well result in liability to the US acquirer.").
III

AND

See GRANT THORNTON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS REPORT, CROSS-BORDER MERGERS

ACQUISITIONS:

BUILDING

MOMENTUM

3

(2012),

available

at

http://www.gta.co.bw/publications/international business/publications/IBR2012-MA-report.pdf
(noting increasing cross-border mergers and acquisitions despite current global economic challenges). United States companies remain "near the top" of international rankings with respect to
their level of M&A activity. Id.
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transactional marketplace, therefore creates an environment in which a corporate principal may be at the mercy of a third party's business ethics

standards. 112
D.

JudicialPrevention of PrivateFCPA Enforcement

In Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,"' the Sixth Circuit held that the
FCPA does not contain a private right of action. 114 Lamb involved a group
of domestic tobacco growers who alleged that certain "donations" made in
the course of Phillip Morris's international dealings violated the FCPA and
depressed tobacco prices in the United States. 115 The plaintiffs argued that
a private right of action should be inferred from the wording of the statute
given the absence of an express remedy for private parties. 116 The court
analyzed the legislative history of the Act and concluded that private plaintiffs were not the "intended beneficiaries." 117 Rather, the FCPA "was...
designed to protect the integrity of American foreign policy and domestic
markets." 118
Lamb generated significant scholarly discussion, much of which
argues that the Act should be redrafted or reinterpreted to allow for a private right of action. 119 Brett Witter argues that the mere fact that the Act

112 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 5, at 297.
Corporate principals often utilize
"non-establishment forms" of business such as foreign sales agents or distributorship agreements

with independent businesses in the target country in order to achieve greater penetration of international markets. See id. However, these arrangements are precisely the type of "middleman"
relationships that often lead to violations of the Act. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ENERGY INDUSTRY, ENERGY
BOARD
NETWORK
ROUNDTABLE
UPDATE
2-3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/foreign-corrupt-practicesact/assets/energy board network roundtable.pdf. Therefore, the American principal is in a position where it must go to great lengths to vet the foreign agent and ensure compliance with the
FCPA prior to doing business with the foreign entity. See id.at 3-4 (addressing necessity for due
diligence investigations).
113 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990).
114 See id.at 1029-30 (dismissing plaintiffs claim under FCPA); see also J.S. Serv. Ctr.
Corp. v. General Electric Technical Servs. Co., 937 F. Supp. 216, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (reaffirming proposition that FCPA does not contain private right of action). The J.S. Service Center court
dismissed the plaintiff's argument for an implied private right of action under the Act as an "unconvincing [and] fanciful" reading of the statute. ld.
115 Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1025.
116 See id. at 1028.
117 ld. at 1029.
118 See id. (reasoning that FCPA's law enforcement considerations illustrate intent to favor
government over private enforcement).
119 See Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. Bus. L.. 419, 486 (2012) (arguing that FCPA should be amended to include a private right of action); Daniel Pines, Comment,
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gives the DOJ and SEC enforcement prerogatives should not be interpreted
as giving the government exclusive enforcement authority. 120 Daniel Pines
proposes amending the FCPA to allow for a private cause of action in cases
121
where a competitor is harmed by a covered party's violation of the Act.
Lamb goes a long way in constricting the FCPA's ability to remedy harms
done to interested parties within the United States by acts of international

bribery. 122
Eighteen months prior to Lamb however, the issue of private FCPA
enforcement was taken up in the context of a shareholder derivative suit.121
In Shields v. Erickson,1 24 shareholders filed suit against 18 officers and directors of a corporation for a host of "wrongful acts" including violations
of the FCPA. The Shields court dismissed the action on the same grounds
that would later justify the Sixth Circuit's holding in Lamb, namely that the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act did not contain a private right of action. 125
III. FCPA SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
A.

The ShareholderDerivative Suit and Rule 23.1

Of the combined one-hundred -twenty-three enforcement actions
taken by DOJ and the SEC since 2010, a great majority have been against
126
corporations, most of which are publicly traded in the United States.
The negative publicity, loss of goodwill and severity of financial penalties
often lead dissatisfied shareholders to seek redress by way of derivative actions and shareholder class action suits. 12 However, while managers and

Amending the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct to Include a Private Right of Action, 82 CALIF. L.
REV. 185, 216 (1994) (proposing private right of action to rectify some of FCPA's flaws.); see
also Brett Witter, Note, Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990): The Sixth
Circuit Gets Sheepish on Foreign CorruptPractices Act Enforcement, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 533,
560 (1992) (criticizing Lamb as having been "an incorrect decision").
120 Witter, supra note 119, at 551. Witter cites the Advisers Act of 1940 which contained the
same language regarding the SEC's discretion to prosecute, however, the Commission's authority
was held not to be exclusive. Id.
121 See Pines, supra note 119, at 216-17 (outlining proposed amendment to Act).
122 See supra Part I.A (noting congressional discussions on detrimental effects of foreign
bribery).
123 Shields v. Erickson, 710 F. Supp. 686, 688 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
124 710 F. Supp. at 688.
125 Id.
126 See sources cited supra note 61 (noting recent enforcement actions).
127

See JESSIE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., & RONALD

1.

GILSON,

CASES

AND

825 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 7th ed. 2008) ("The shareholders'
derivative suit was created by equity courts to permit a shareholder to vindicate wrongs done to
the corporation as a whole that management, because of either self-interest or neglect, would not
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
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directors are increasingly exposed to liability under the FCPA, shareholders
are often left to foot the bill because their attempts to hold board members
accountable have fallen on deaf ears. 121 Procedural rules governing derivative actions are among the main reasons why shareholder efforts to hold
their boards accountable
for FCPA violations have gone largely unheeded
129
years.
recent
in
Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure spells out the
pleading requirements for corporate derivative litigation."O The rule is
among the most widely discussed rules of civil procedure, and it has been
the subject of intense academic criticism for many years."' Rule 23.1
states that a shareholder must "state with particularity: any effort by the
plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the directors ... and ... the reasons for not... making the effort." 132 Rule 23.1 has become known as the
codification of the "demand rule" because of its objective of encouraging
shareholders to exhaust internal remedies before seeking redress from the
courts. 133

remedy.").
128 See cases discussed infra Part III.B (observing dismissal of shareholder derivative actions
seeking director liability).
129 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b) (setting pleading requirement for derivative actions). Most
states have enacted provisions that are almost identical to Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for corporate derivative litigation. See Matthew L. Mustokoff, ShareholderDiscovery,
The PSLRA and SLUSA In ParallelSecurities and Derivative Actions, 35 No. 2 SEC. REG. L.J.
Art. 2 (2007) (noting Rule 23.1 and its "state court counterparts .. . codify the .
'demand' requirement").
130 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(b).
131 See Kurt A. Goehre, Comment, Is the Demand Requirement Obsolete? How the United
Kingdom Modernized Its Shareholder Derivative Procedure and What the United States Can
Learn from It, 28 wIS. INT'L L.J. 140, 142 (2010) (criticizing demand requirement as "leav[ing]
shareholders without recourse" when directors violate fiduciary obligations). Goehre endorses
the approach taken by the United Kingdom under the "Companies Act" which directs judges to
assess the merits of a shareholder derivative claim. Id. at 142-43. Under this procedure, "more
modern, flexible and accessible criteria for determining whether a shareholder can pursue an action" allow for a more equitable and efficient resolution to derivative actions. Id. at 142; see also
David P. Curtin, Demand of Directors in a ShareholderDerivative Suit When the Board Has Approved the
Wrong,
26
B.C.
L.
REv.
441,
442
(1985),
available at
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol26/iss2/4 (criticizing Rule 23.1 as placing "unreasonable
burden" on shareholders in derivative action). Curtin argues that the demand requirement should
be waived in cases where the board has participated or authorized the transaction giving rise to
the derivative litigation. Id.; see also Justice Jack B. Jacobs, The Vanishing Substance-Procedure
Distinction in Contemporary CorporateLitigation: An Essay, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 7 (2007)
(explaining how Rule 23.1 influences substantive aspects of corporate litigation, although purely
procedural safeguard).
132 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(B).
133 See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 69, at 478 ("Demand is the means whereby the board
of directors . . . has an opportunity to manage litigation in the corporation's name or on its behalf.").
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Under Delaware law the demand rule requires the plaintiff to (1)
make a pre-suit demand on the corporation's board to bring suit on the corporation's behalf; or (2) show that such a demand would have been futile,
in which case demand is excused. 114 Demand futility is analyzed under the
test set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson v. Lewis,13 5 which
examines whether a shareholder has pled particularized facts which raise a
reasonable doubt as to either (1) the board's disinterestedness and independence in considering the demand; or (2) that the challenged transaction
was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment. If a
plaintiff has not made a demand and the derivative action fails the demand
futility test, the suit will be dismissed and the shareholder will be left with-

out recourse.

136

The derivative suit generally alleges a breach of a fiduciary duty
that the defendant owed the corporation as an entity.137 Although corporate
134 See In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(discussing demand requirement and legal standard for demand excusal).
135 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (outlining demand futility test).
136 See id.at 818 (reversing chancery court's denial of motion to dismiss because demand
futility not established). In a similar context under a forum non conveniens inquiry, the Texas
Supreme Court sharply criticized the use of pleading formalities to insulate defendants from liability due to a choice of forum deficiency in the plaintiffs complaint. See Dow Chem. Co. v.
Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 683 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., concurring) (decrying dismissal of
warranted lawsuits due to forum non conveniens). Justice Doggett strongly condemned the use of
forum non conveniens as a means of "kill[ing] the litigation altogether," and thereby protecting
defendants from being answerable for their alleged misconduct. ld. at 682. Dismissal under forum non conveniens generally "end[s] the litigation" and the "plaintiffs leave the courtroom without having had their case resolved on the merits." ld. at 683.
137 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) ("Corporate officers and directors...
stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders."); see also Jessica Erickson,
CorporateMisconduct and the Perfect Storm of ShareholderLitigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
75, 87 (2008) ("[D]erivative suits are ... premised on fiduciary duty violations."). The underlying issue in a derivative action is whether the fiduciary "failed to meet the demanding standards
that Delaware law imposes on him-the highest degree of loyalty, care, and good faith for the
sole benefit of the shareholders[.]" Ryan v.Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 270-71 (Del. Ch. 2007). The
idea that common law fiduciary obligations act as the primary means of promoting sound corporate governance has been criticized as inadequate and unworkable. See Celia R. Taylor, The Inadequacy of FiduciaryDoctrine: Why CorporateManagers Have Little to Fearand What Might
Be Done About It, 85 OR. L. REV. 993, 994 (2006) (arguing corporate fiduciary obligations are
insufficient to properly regulate directorial conduct and limit malfeasance). Taylor argues that
fiduciary duties, as currently imposed on corporate decision makers, are incapable of inducing
any form of meaningful corporate compliance. ld. Directors and officers are in a position to
conduct the affairs of the company with "virtual impunity" because "courts will not often ... second-guess their managerial decisions." ld. at 994-95. Corporate fiduciary obligations are based
on the "trusteeship strategy," which has become the governance model of choice in the United
States for solving corporate agency problems. See REINIER KRAAKMAN, JOHN ARMOUR, PAUL
DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, HENRY B. HANSMANN, GERARD HERTIG, KLAUS J. HOPT, HIDEKI
KANDA, & EDWARD B. ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND

FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 65 (2d ed. 2009) (describing United States as "originator" and "most
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fiduciaries are bound by an obligation to exercise due care, numerous states
have enacted legislation enabling corporations to shield directors from personal liability for breaching the duty of care by incorporating an exculpation provision in the certificate of incorporation."' Due to the "widespread
adoption" of exculpation clauses, the derivative plaintiff is required to rely
on one of the four areas of misconduct which Section 102(b)(7) excludes
from its scope: breaches of the duty of loyalty, intentional misconduct or
knowing violations of law, actions done in bad faith, or transactions involving improper personal benefits.13 9 Further complicating the matter is the
fact that derivative suits, by nature, are brought against directors in their
individual capacities on behalf of the corporation. 140 As a result, any recovery is returned to the company treasury and not paid out to the share-

holders directly. 141
B.

ShareholderDerivative Actions in Response to FCPA Violations
Since 2011

As Lamb and Shields effectively foreclosed the possibility of an
implied private right of enforcement under the Act, shareholders of issuers
who have been subjected to FCPA scrutiny have continued to seek redress
through shareholder derivative actions and securities fraud class actions. 142
With an eye towards the increasingly aggressive nature and frequency of
FCPA prosecutions, issuers are more vulnerable than ever to be scrutinized

enthusiastic proponent" of trusteeship strategy). The trusteeship strategy requires corporate
boards to be staffed with "independent" directors who are not beholden to management interests
at the expense of other corporate constituencies, and act as fiduciaries to the corporate entity. See
id.at 64. This approach has led to a corporate governance structure in which directors are principally motivated by "ethical and reputational concerns." Id.at 65. This may help explain Taylor's
characterization of the fiduciary doctrine as having "little effect" on directorial behavior. Taylor,
supra, at 995.
138 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014) (allowing exculpation provision in certificate of incorporation for breaches of duty of care). The statute however, specifically excludes
"acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law" from exculpation. Id.
139 Id.;
see also Erickson, supra note 137, at 89 (stating derivative plaintiff cannot rely on
breach of duty of care as grounds for recovery).
140 See CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 127, at 826 (explaining nature and purpose
of shareholder derivative suit); see also Erickson, supra note 137, at 82 (noting similarities and
differences between shareholder derivative suits and securities class actions).
141 See CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 127, at 826 (describing mechanics of
shareholder derivative litigation).
142 See Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: CollateralShareholderLitigation
Following
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1218 (2012) (noting rise in
collateral shareholder litigation coinciding with increased FCPA enforcement).

2013-2014]

CORPORATE BRIBERY

at home for their business ventures abroad. 143 However, while the DOJ and
SEC aggressively hold global businesses accountable for their acts of overseas bribery, their shareholders have enjoyed little to no success in their efforts to recoup what was lost as a result of one or more FCPA violations. 144
i) Strong v. Taylor
In Strong, a shareholder of Tidewater, Inc. ("Tidewater") brought a
derivative action against officers and members of the board after the company was forced to pay over $15 million to settle multiple matters relating
to violations of the FCPA and other securities laws.145 The underlying issue concerned a wholly owned subsidiary of Tidewater, Tidewater Marine
International, Inc., which allegedly committed multiple violations of the
Act in its dealings in Nigeria and Azerbaij an. 146 The plaintiff alleged that
the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by knowingly or recklessly
disregarding multiple corrupt payments made by the company's employees,
subsequently recording them as "legitimate expenses," and failing to maintain adequate internal FCPA compliance mechanisms.147 In particular, the
complaint stated that the defendants made a deliberate calculation to allow
the bribes because the likely fines would not outweigh the value of the
business that was generated by the payments in question.14' As a result, the
company suffered significant damages to its goodwill and reputation, in

143

See Witten, Morrissey & Vidal, supra note 59 (discussing how increased FCPA enforce-

ment affects international energy companies).
144 See Emily Jane Fox, Wal-Mart Expands Foreign CorruptionProbe, CNN MONEY (Nov.
15,
2012,
9:09
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/15/news/companies/walmartinvestigation/index.html?hpt=hp c3 (noting fall in company stock price in wake of foreign corruption probe); see also Westbrook, supra note 142, at 1218 (discussing "limited success" of
FCPA shareholder litigation). Although some shareholder derivative actions that have followed
an FCPA investigation have resulted in settlement, not one has been fully litigated. Id. at 1228.
But see Brian Grow, Bribery Investigations Spark Shareholder Suits, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2010,
2:46
PM)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/1 1/01/us-bribery-lawsuitsidUSTRE6A04CO20101 101 (reporting rise in shareholder litigation as result of increased FCPA
enforcement). Grow reported on a "Reuters Legal [A]nalysis," which found that a significant
amount of shareholder actions triggered by FCPA actions resulted in settlements; however, this
may be due to defendants' fear of facing sympathetic juries who may be inclined to return even
larger verdicts. Ild. According to Grow, none of the twenty-four complaints filed in 2010 have
even reached the motion-to-dismiss stage. Id. Therefore, the likelihood of a settlement does not
appear to be due to judicial willingness to accommodate the shareholders' plight, but rather,
courts have taken the opposite approach and barred most derivative actions from surviving a motion to dismiss. See id.
145 Strong v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d 433, 439-40 (E.D. La. 2012).
146 Id. at 439.
147 Id. at 440.
148 Id. at 447.
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addition to the financial penalties paid to the government. 149
Because the plaintiff had not made a pre-suit demand on the board,
the Rule 23.1 demand requirement was triggered, and the plaintiff was required to plead futility in order to proceed with the action.150 In its discussion about the various ways to achieve excusal of the demand requirement,
the court stated that the plaintiff failed to meet the first prong of the Aronson test because, although "there [were] several areas ... that may implicate the interest of [the] board," the complaint failed to show a "material" interest held by a majority of the board. 15' The court then applied what
is known as the Rales 52 test, which excuses demand as futile in an oversight failure claim where there was a "substantial likelihood" of personal
liability for the directors who consider the demand. 153 The court stated the
standard to plead demand futility in an oversight failure claim as follows:
To have a substantial likelihood of director liability on an
oversight claim, 'a plaintiff must plead the existence of
facts suggesting that the board knew that internal controls
were inadequate, that the inadequacies could leave room
for illegal or materially harmful behavior, and that the
board chose to do nothing about the control deficiencies
that it knew existed. 154
The outcome under Rales was not much different, as the court dismissed the plaintiff's assertions as "completely conclusory," reasoning that
the defendants' conduct was not sufficiently "egregious" to produce a substantial likelihood of personal liability. 155 The case was ultimately dis149 Id.

150 Strong, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
151 Id. at 444-45.

152 See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (discussing "substantial likelihood" of liability standard in relation to impartial demand consideration).
153 Strong, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
154 Id. at 449 (quoting Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 940 (Del. 2007)); see also In re
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (outlining directorial
oversight duties). "A director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a
corporate information and reporting system ... exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may... render a director liable .. ." Id. at 970.
155 Id. at 447-48. In another case, the Delaware Chancery Court had occasion to analyze an
oversight failure claim in the context of shareholder allegations of bribery relating to a joint venture in Kuwait. See In re Dow Chem. Co. Derivative Litig.,No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769, at *5
(Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010). Dow endorsed application of the Rales test when the allegations are of
"board inaction" relating to bribery. Id. at *6 n. 5. The court then accepted the plaintiffs' factual
allegation that bribes may have been paid in Kuwait as sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
Id. at * 13. However, because the complaint failed to allege that the board had any "cause for suspicion" with respect to the payment of bribes, their allegations were "simply too attenuated" to

2013-2014]

CORPORATE BRIBERY

missed. 156
ii) Freuler v. Parker
In Freuler, a shareholder filed suit against several officers and directors of Parker Drilling Company (the company) alleging that the defendants failed to adequately oversee their corporate compliance program,
and authorized a number of payments in violation of the FCPA. 157 In particular, it was alleged that the defendants caused the company to operate in
high corruption risk areas, including Kazakhstan and Nigeria, and that they
"knew" of and "authorized" a system of official bribery. 158 The plaintiff
sought to establish multiple counts of directorial fiduciary violations
against each individual defendant. 159
The court began its analysis by imposing the Rule 23.1 hurdle, stating that the "plaintiff must meet stringent requirements of factual particularity" to satisfy the pleading standard. 16 Because the plaintiff did not
make a pre-suit demand, the court required the plaintiff to plead demand
futility for a majority of the defendants by alleging specific violations of
the Act by each director named in the complaint. 16' The defendants argued
that the complaint charged every defendant with knowledge of the purported wrong, based simply on the fact that the wrong had occurred, and that
this allegation failed to meet the particularity standard. 162 Furthermore, the

support an oversight failure claim. ld. Accordingly, Dow falls in line with its corollary cases in
federal court protecting directors charged with abdicating their oversight duties in the context of
international bribery schemes. TARUN, supra note 70, at 72 (describing Dow as a "significant
decision favorable to directors" facing oversight failure claims). But see Gabriela Jara, Following
on the Foreign CorruptPractices Act: The Dynamic Shareholder Derivative Suit, 63 DUKE L.J.
199, 212 (2013) (citing Strong's application of Rales test as a "distot[ion of] the demand futility
analysis"). Jara notes that "courts outside of Delaware insist on trying to fit the FCPA-related
[oversight failure] claims into the traditional self-dealing paradigm of loyalty violations." ld. at
216. A demand futility analysis however, is not limited to self-dealing transactions; the standard
may also be met by a showing of a "substantial likelihood of liability for failing to oversee the
violation." ld. at 217; see also In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970
(Del. Ch. 1996) ("[A] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a
corporate information and reporting system ... exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may ... render a director liable").
156 Strong, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
157 Freuler v. Parker, 803 F. Supp. 2d 630, 633 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
158 ld. at 641. According to the complaint, the company also suffered the loss of goodwill
and damage to its reputation, in addition to over $20 million in internal investigative costs. ld.
159 See id. at 648 (charging five counts of breach of fiduciary duty owed to company).
160 Id. at 638.
161 Id.
162 See Freuler,803 F. Supp. 2d at 648 (reciting defendant's argument that complaint lacked
requisite particularity).
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defendants contended that it was improper under Delaware law to impute
one director's knowledge of wrongdoing upon the other individuals sitting
on the board with him for the purposes of demand excusal. 161
The court agreed with the defendants, holding that the plaintiff had
not met the "enhanced pleading requirements" to excuse the failure to make
a demand. 164 The court stated that the complaint lacked sufficient factual
allegations of each individual's role within the bribery scheme. 165 Accordingly, the case was dismissed. 166
iii) Holt v. Golden
In Holt, a group of shareholders sued derivatively on behalf of
Smith & Wesson Holding Corp., a firearms manufacturer, alleging members of the board and company officers breached their duty of care by failing to maintain effective FCPA controls. 16 The action was based on the
hiring and subsequent promotion of an individual by the name of Amaro
Goncalves to the rank of Vice President of law enforcement, international,
and U.S. government sales. 16 Goncalves
was indicted in 2009 for violat169
FCPA.
the
violate
to
conspiring
and
ing
The plaintiffs argued that the board failed to properly exercise its
duty of care by allowing Goncalves to be hired, rise up through the corporate ranks, and engage in numerous acts of bribery, which culminated in his
indictment. 1 70 Although the court dismissed the action on issue preclusion
grounds, it noted that it would have dismissed the case due to insufficient

163

Id.

164

Ild. at 652.

165

Id.
Id.
Holt v. Golden, 880 F. Supp. 2d 199, 201 (D. Mass. 2012).
Ild. at 201-02. The individual's name was Amaro Goncalves and in 2006 he was able to

166
167
168

generate $20 million in government business alone. ld. at 201. His dealings included the sale of
over 73,000 firearms to the Afghan government, and in 2006, the company's overall international
sales grew by over fifty-eight percent. Id. The fact that firearms dealings with Afghan governmental bodies might catch the attention of FCPA enforcement institutions is hardly surprising in
light of the fact that Afghanistan was ranked last in the world by Transparency International's
2012 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), in a tie with North Korea and Somalia. See
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 (2012), available at
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (ranking 176 states around world according to perception of corruption of their governmental institutions).
169 Holt, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 202. The government dropped the charges against Goncalves in
early 2012 citing resource constraints, and unfavorable evidentiary rulings. See Gov't Mot. Dismiss, United States v. Amaro Goncalves, Criminal No. 09-335 at 1 (Feb. 21, 2012) (stating reasons for dismissal).
170 Holt, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 202.
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particularity under Rule 23.1.17 1 Because the plaintiffs had not made a presuit demand, the court stated that the enhanced pleading standard applied to
establish futility. 172 Dismissal was justified, according to the court because
the complaint merely alleged a temporal coincidence between the expansion of international sales and the subsequent indictment of Goncalves. 171
iv) Moradi v. Adelson
In February 2011, Las Vegas Sands Corporation (LVS) was investigated by the SEC and DOJ, for "possible FCPA violations." 174 Following
the revelation of the investigations, three separate shareholder derivative
actions were filed and later consolidated, charging the LVS board with
breach of fiduciary duty for operating in foreign markets with high corruption risks, yet failing to install internal corporate controls commensurate to
such risks.175 However, at the time of filing these derivative actions, LVS
had created a Special17 Litigation Committee (SLC) to investigate the shareholders' allegations. 1
On August 27, 2012, the court granted the defendants' motion to
stay the proceedings pending the findings of the SLC, although, the plaintiffs had raised doubts about the disinterestedness of the committee, as
three of its members were defendants in the action. 177 The court reasoned
that because the SLC was expending a significant amount of company resources that would be further strained by a concurrent lawsuit, as well as
the "complexity of the investigation," a stay of the proceeding was warranted.17 ' Approximately six months later, LVS disclosed that there had
been "likely violations of the books and records9 and internal controls provisions of the FCPA," in its annual 10-K filing. 17

171

Id.at 203.

172

Id.
Id.at 204.
Moradi v. Adelson, No. 2:11-cv-00490-MMD-RJJ, 2012 WL 3687576, at *1 (D. Nev.

173
174

Aug 27, 2012).
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.at *2-3.
178 Id. at *3.
179

LAS VEGAS SANDS

CORP., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(D) of the Securi-

ties
Exchange
Act
of
1934
(Mar.
1,
2013),
http://investor.lasvegassands.com/secfiling.cfm?filinglD=1 193125-13-87854.

available

at
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IV. ANALYSIS
Corporate decision makers apparently do not have to fear personal
monetary liability for their negligence, willful blindness, or even express
authorization of international bribery schemes that result in immense quantifiable and non-quantifiable losses.180 While U.S. authorities are cracking
down on foreign corruption at an unprecedented pace, it appears as though
one's only hope is to stay out of the crosshairs of an FCPA investigation
altogether, because defenses are difficult to impossible to mount. 181 Yet,
while the government rushes from one enforcement success to another,
shareholders have been left empty-handed with no directorial accountabil182
ity to them.
Since 2010, not a single shareholder derivative suit following an
FCPA violation has been successfully litigated.1 83 At the same time, however, American corporations and their decision makers are as vulnerable as
ever to federal investigation and/or prosecution under the Act. 184 In light of
expanded investigatory activity, the fact that corporate decision makers are
not held personally accountable for the losses which their actions incur,
flies in the face of basic principles of equity. 185 While the shareholders of a
publicly traded corporation are its owners, and thus have a direct interest in

180 See Daniel J. Grimm, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Merger and Acquisition
Transactions: Successor Liability and its Consequences, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 247, 293 (2010)
("Uncovering the FCPA problems of a target entity prior to closing a transaction is now viewed
as key to avoiding a parade of horribles, including costly government investigations and the potential for a dramatic downward swing in the market value or stock price of the assets recently
purchased.") (internal quotations omitted); see also cases cited supra Part IlI.B.
181 See Sheahen, supra note 46, at 465 (characterizing nature of FCPA affirmative defenses
as "hollow" and "illusory" in practice); see also Part II.B supra (discussing increased enforcement activity).
182 See cases cited supra Part IlI.B. Aside from aggressively prosecuting FCPA violations in
the courtroom, the DOJ also makes frequent use of deferred prosecution agreements ("DPAs")
and non-prosecution agreements ("NPAs") as part of its FCPA enforcement strategy. See also
Mark, supra note 119, at 434. DPAs and NPAs involve an agreement by the investigated party to
pay a fine and to institute corporate oversight reforms in return for the government's promise not
to prosecute. Id. Corporate DPA and NPA payments totaled a whopping $7.6 billion for 2010
and 2011 combined, as "record-breaking" enforcement of the FCPA was among the major contributors to this staggering number. GIBSON DUNN, LLP, 2011 Year-End Update on Corporate
Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements, at 2 (Jan. 4, 2012), available at
http://gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2011 YearEndUpdateCorporateDeferredProsecution-NonProsecutionAgreements.pdf.
183 See cases cited supra Part III.B (observing pattern of dismissal of FCPA shareholder derivative actions).
184 See supra Part II.B & C (observing trend of increased anti-bribery enforcement efforts).
185 See supra Part II.B & C (describing more aggressive nature and improved means of enforcement).
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the company's success, they are also, by nature, the most attenuated from
the corrupt payments that their boards either failed to prevent, or even expressly or implicitly authorized. 18 6 Every time a shareholder derivative action following an FCPA penalty is thrown out before the merits of the suit
are debated, the corporation as an entity and therefore its shareholders incur
the loss, not the directors18 or officers who caused or were complicit in the
underlying wrongful act. 7
The patterns emerging from a holistic view of recent FCPA shareholder derivative actions indicate that procedural hurdles insulate defending boards from being answerable for their alleged violations of the Act.188
In Strong v. Taylor, the court accepted "as truth" the fact that corrupt payments were made and later recorded as "legitimate" expenses by one of the
defendants, yet refused to allow the plaintiff's case to move forward.18 9 It
would appear, however, that such a knowing violation of law coupled with
allegations that the defendants were willfully blind to a multitude of questionable payments should constitute sufficient particularity to survive the
pleading stage due to a "substantial likelihood" of director liability. 190
The fact that corporate executives are required to exercise extraordinary care in their overseas business ventures is not surprising when
viewed in the context of today's anti-corruption landscape.1 91 It is not
merely the increased focus of U.S. regulators and prosecutors on FCPA enforcement, but also collateral developments in the form of new federal securities laws and international anti-corruption efforts that make today's international marketplace legally hazardous. 192 Dodd-Frank and SOX share,

186

See

CHOPER, COFFEE,

& GILSON, supra note 127, at 55 ("management of the regular

business affairs of the corporation is ordinarily vested in the board of directors .... shareholders
generally have very little direct power over the regular affairs of the corporation."); see also supra Part III.B (evaluating shareholder allegations of director and officer misconduct under
FCPA).
187 See supra Part III.B (discussing allegations of harm done to corporations due to FCPA
investigations and fines).
188 See Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 683 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J.,
concurring) (criticizing procedural rules, such as forum non conveniens, that result in cases not
being decided on merits); see also cases cited supra Part III.B (dismissing cases without discussing merits of shareholder allegations).
189 Strong v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d 433, 445 (E.D. La. 2012).
190 See discussion Part III.B supra; see also supra notes 152155 and accompanying text (applying Rales test to determine demand futility based on "substantial likelihood" of director liability).
191 See TARUN, supra note 70, at 67 ("[a] responsible multinational board of directors must
today focus on anti-bribery risks, issues, policies, and compliance"); see also discussion Part II.B
supra (examining recent spike in FCPA enforcement).
192 See discussion supra Part II.B (noting that SOX and Dodd-Frank are federal securities
legislation that ease process of FCPA investigations).
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as one of their core principles the disclosure of violations of securities
laws.193 Because the FCPA is by nature a regulatory statute which applies
to issuers of securities, any violation thereof falls within the scope of what
Dodd-Frank and SOX sought to prevent by increasing the likelihood of exposure. 194 Thus, with Dodd-Frank's whistleblower protection and incentive scheme and SOX' effort to strengthen internal corporate oversight
mechanisms, exposure of FCPA violations becomes
more likely, which
95
logically increases the probability of investigation. 1
It appears counterintuitive that even as SOX obligates corporate
decision-makers to take an active role in overseeing their company's activities, shareholders are still unable to establish basic pleading predicates for
judicial review of alleged violations of these duties. 196 Where the government successfully extracts immense financial penalties from publicly traded companies for, at times widespread, systematic and continuous acts of
corruption, it would appear that judicial inquiry into the effectiveness of
corporate oversight mechanisms would be in order in a subsequent derivative action. 197 Although the investigation of an alleged international bribery scheme after a signing officer certifies the effectiveness of the issuer's
internal controls does not in and of itself constitute a violation of an affirmative duty under federal securities law, shareholders should be entitled to a
discussion of what produced the investigation.198 However, as long as Rule
23.1 acts as a technical barrier to a full-fledged judicial inquiry into the defendants' compliance with their fiduciary obligations, shareholders will
remain constrained in their efforts to vindicate the harm done to the corporation.199
Enhanced disclosure obligations derived from domestic legislative
developments are merely one element of the increased risk of FCPA scruti193

See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 69, at 138 ("[SOX] deals with ...

increased disclo-

sure ... in the securities business"); Blount & Markel, supra note 64, at 1039 (evaluating possibility of race to disclose securities violations between company and whistleblowers).
194 See BLOUNT & MARKEL, supra note 64, at 1039 (specifying FCPA violations as triggering possible need to self-report).
195 See id. (analyzing self-reporting obligations); and PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 69, at
137-38 (evaluating objectives of SOX).
196 See Klaw, supra note 39 at 316-17 (discussing how SOX affects liability under FCPA);
supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text (discussing oversight obligations of certain corporate
officers under SOX).
197 See cases cited supra Part III.B (observing procedural rules of shareholder litigation preventing judicial inquiry into merits of alleged fiduciary violations).
198 See cases discussed supra Part III.B (noting demand requirement and its effect on FCPA
shareholder derivative litigation).
199 See Curtin, supra note 131, at 457 (noting relaxation of demand requirement would be
"more fair" to derivative plaintiffs); Goehre, supra note 131, at 142 & 152 (characterizing derivative procedure as complex and inadequate to safeguard shareholder interests).
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ny. 2 00 As the United States and the OECD are joined by an increasing
number of willing partners in the global fight against bribery, U.S. enforcement authorities are able to tap into an expanded well of information
related to corrupt payments by its businesses abroad. 20 1 Furthermore, with
the Fifth Circuit's holding in Jeong, any prosecution of a covered entity
that takes place in a foreign court will not bar U.S. authorities from taking
action for the same underlying wrongful act, thereby not violating constitutional protections against double jeopardy.20 2 Accordingly, U.S. regulatory
and prosecutorial bodies not only act with an enhanced mandate to weed
out corporate corruption, but they also enjoy a much wider array of avenues
to be put on notice of wrongdoing both domestically and internationally. 203
The pattern of unsuccessful FCPA derivative litigation is a prime
example of how a procedural hurdle may have significant effects, not only
on the substantive elements of a lawsuit (mainly because the substantive
aspects are not litigated) but on anti-corruption efforts as a whole. 2 04 Former Delaware Chancery Court Judge, Jack B. Jacobs, noted that although
Rule 23.1 was intended to protect corporate decision makers from strike
suits by overzealous attorneys looking to cash in on a court-awarded fee, it
created - perhaps unexpectedly - a situation in which substantive aspects
of the law were of essence at the pleading stage. 205 A corollary to Justice
Jacobs' observation that Rule 23.1 is overstepping its bounds as a procedural safeguard may be stated as follows: Rule 23.1 acts as a tool to insulate corporate fiduciaries from having to answer for violations of their duties, the facts of which have already been established by an extensive
government investigation and the subsequent agreement
to pay an exorbi2 6
tant fine as a consequence of violating the FCPA. 0

200
201

See Part II.B supra (discussing international anti-bribery enforcement collaboration).
See Part II.B supra (analyzing international efforts to streamline anti-corruption enforce-

ment).
202

See Jeong, 624 F.3d at 712 ("Double jeopardy ...

does not attach when separate sover-

eigns prosecute the same offense .... ).
203 See Andrew S. Boutros & Markus Funk, Carbon Copy Prosecutions:A Growing AntiCorruptionPhenomenon in a Shrinking World, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 259, 271 (2013) ("[A] single improper payment can trigger liability not only in the US under the FCPA and in the country
where the bribe took place, but in every jurisdiction that claims a codified interest in putting an
end to foreign bribery by those that carry on a business ... within its territories."); see also supra
Part II.B (discussing increased political commitment and international efforts to fight international bribery).
204 See Jacobs, supra note 131, at 4 (characterizing Rule 23.1 as example of how procedural
rule has "blurred the substance-procedure distinction").
205 See id. at 4-5 ("to answer a procedural question - how to plead demand futility
- a court
would have to determine whether a doctrine of substantive law - the business judgment rule would or would not apply to protect the complained of board action.").
206 See id. (observing Delaware Supreme Court's justification for demand requirement). Ja-

232

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XIX

In Delaware, the knowing violation of an affirmative legal duty is
among the specifically enumerated wrongful acts that may not be excluded
in an exculpation provision in the corporate charter.20 It follows that the
knowing omission or violation of an affirmative legal duty, in and of itself
constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. 20 8 However, a procedural rule, and
not a substantive argument in defense of the defendant's actions, tends to
decide the outcome of most FCPA shareholder derivative actions; many of
which allege precisely the type of knowing violation of law which corporate statues and jurisprudence seek to prevent.20 9
Procedural rules are intended to "prescribe the mechanics of litigation," not to control the outcome of the dispute itself.210 In Strong, the corporation was subjected to an immense penalty for its failure to comply
with, or properly take into account the aggressive nature of FCPA enforcement, yet Rule 23.1 prevented any type of judicial inquiry, and therefore, any accountability for the alleged misconduct. 211 Based on the fact
that a pecuniary corporate loss was already established in the form of the
fine that was paid, in addition to allegations of other immeasurable losses,
the action in Strong would not appear to fall under the category of the type
212
of meritless strike suit which Rule 23.1 was intended to prevent.
When shareholders sue their directors alleging fiduciary breaches
for violations of the Act, they are seeking redress on behalf of the corporation as a third party that was harmed by their decision makers' and employees' failure to comply with the FCPA. 21 3 As third party victims of corrupt
foreign business practices, shareholders are among the groups of individuals whom commentators have sought to address by discussing a private
right of action under the Act.214 Aside from enabling third parties to seek

cobs notes: "The Supreme Court grounded the demand requirement upon a substantive rationale
- that the statutory power of a corporate board to 'manage the business and affairs of the corporation' included the power to bring, or refuse to bring, a lawsuit on the corporation's behalf." ld.;
see also supra note 180 (discussing DPAs and NPAs).
207 See supra note 137 and accompanying text (noting § 102(b)(7) and allowance of limited
exculpation provisions).
208 See South v. Baker, 62 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. Ch. 2012) ("[D]irectors can be held liable ...
for
knowingly causing or consciously permitting the corporation to violate positive law.").
209 See cases discussed supra Part IlI.B.
210 See Jacobs, supra note 131, at 1 (describing basic distinctive characteristics between substantive and procedural rules of law).
211 Strong v. Taylor, 877 F. Supp. 2d 433, 439-40 (E.D. La. 2012).
212 Id. at 440 (discussing various allegations in complaint).
213 See Westbrook, supra note 142, at 1226 (explaining legal concept of shareholder derivative action in context of FCPA violation).
214 See id. at 1224 (characterizing collateral shareholder litigation following FCPA investigations as "de facto emergence of private actions"); Mark, supra note 119, at 419 (arguing for private right of action under the Act).
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redress for the harms they suffer as a result of corrupt payment schemes, a
private right of action, it is argued, would "enhance deterrence of foreign
bribery. 215
One commentator has described shareholder derivative and class
action suits as a "de facto emergence of private actions" under the
FCPA. 2 " Although FCPA shareholder derivative litigation contains several of the characteristics of a private right of action - mainly private parties
seeking redress for harms they suffered as a result of violations of codified
law - to characterize these suits as a disguised private action presupposes at
least the possibility of success on the merits. 217 However, given the outcome patterns of these cases, such an assumption would be generous at
best.218

With the flood of shareholder litigation following governmental
bribery investigations of American companies, a judicial reinterpretation of
pleading formalities could provide a similar deterrent effect with respect to
corrupt international business practices. 21 9 Although incorporation of a
private right of action may induce enhanced directorial attentiveness to the
Act, the same would likely be achieved by relaxing of the demand futility
standard and allowing shareholders to be heard on the merits of their alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. Corporate decision makers would have
a direct financial incentive to ensure their subordinates' compliance because of the financial ramifications of personal liability derived from a fiduciary violation.220
V. CONCLUSION
What emerges from the failed lawsuits seeking accountability for
reckless or knowing failures to comply with the FCPA are boards of directors attempting to navigate a corporation through a high risk enforcement
215

See Mark, supra note 119, at 505 (concluding that recognition of private right of action

under FCPA would render numerous benefits).
216 See Westbrook, supra note 142, at 1224 (analogizing shareholder suits to private right of
action under the Act).
217 See id.(analyzing shareholder litigation following FCPA scrutiny in context of private
right of action).
218 See supra Part III.B (noting pattern of unsuccessful shareholder derivative suits due to
corporate law pleading rules).
219 See Goehre, supra note 131, at 167 (endorsing enhanced judicial discretion as opposed to
adherence to demand futility in shareholder derivative litigation); see also cases discussed supra
Part III.A (explaining shareholder derivative pleading requirement and demand futility under
Rule 23.1).
220 See CHOPER, COFFEE, & GILSON, supra note 127, at 920 (discussing issue of litigation
expenses for corporate managers).
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environment, but who have no personal incentive aside from their basic fiduciary obligations to ensure compliance. The continued failure of courts
to hold directors personally liable for their acquiescence or approval of
their company's systematic acts of bribery prevents directors from having a
personal pecuniary interest in at least not giving their expressed approval to
overseas bribery schemes. Effectively tying FCPA compliance to the possibility of personal liability through shareholder derivative litigation may
do the trick in terms of inducing directorial attentiveness to the Act and efficiently fighting global corruption.
David Bastian

